Abstract-As electric power system operators shift from conventional energy to renewable energy sources, power distribution systems will experience increasing fluctuations in supply. These fluctuations present the need to not only design online decentralized power allocation algorithms, but also characterize how effective they are given fast-changing consumer demand and generation. In this paper, we present an online decentralized dual descent (OD3) power allocation algorithm and determine (in the worst case) how much of observed social welfare can be explained by fluctuations in generation capacity and consumer demand. Convergence properties and performance guarantees of the OD3 algorithm are analyzed by characterizing the difference between the online decision and the optimal decision. We demonstrate validity and accuracy of the theoretical results in the paper through numerical experiments using real power generation data.
I. INTRODUCTION
A S THE quest to integrate more renewable energy sources into the power distribution grid continues, it is important to understand how systemic fluctuations both in renewable energy generation and consumer demand affect real-time power allocation policies and the social welfare of distribution systems. Despite the increasing popularity of renewable energy sources, they experience high variability in generation capacity [1] , [2] . Though wind forecasting is generally used to reduce uncertainty in day ahead schedules for wind power generation, variability in the wind resource continues to pose challenges for the integration of wind power in forward electricity markets [3] . Similar conclusions can easily be made of solar energy. To better understand the impact of penetrating renewable energy into the grid, the market value of these renewable sources have also been analyzed; for instance, in [4] , the authors characterized how the market value of renewable energy sources varies with grid integration. Their study found that the value of wind power fell from 110% of the average power price to about 50 − 80% as wind penetration increased from zero to 30% of total electricity consumption. The outcome of the study on price fluctuation highlights the difficulty in integrating large-scale renewable energy into the distribution grid. Similar studies in [5] , [6] noted the significant impact of variability of renewable energy sources on the operations of electricity markets.
The inherent variability of renewable energy sources easily propagates to distribution systems and poses a challenge to system operators who aim to coordinate or monitor the operation of electrical power distribution systems. Amongst others, an objective of system operators is to allocate power (usually limited in supply) to end users in a way that optimizes the aggregate social welfare of the system. Similar resource allocation problems have been studied widely in different contexts, including communication [7] , [8] and power systems [9] . For example, in a system comprising N users where each user has a utility function U i (·), the objective of the system operator is typically to maximize the aggregate social welfare subject to available system resource Q, mathematically formulated as:
(1)
In Problem (1), the task of the system operator is to determine how much power, q i , to allocate each user i to maximize the aggregate users' utility. Common schemes to solve Problem (1) in a distributed way (like descent, gradient-based algorithms),
We propose an alternate approach to the aforementioned coordination scheme in which the decentralized power allocation algorithm is implemented in real-time: At each time-step, the system operator updates the coordination signal (which is usually able to be interpreted as the price signal), and users locally compute their optimal allocations based on the price signal and individual utility/need. With this approach, a number of interesting questions arise, including performance guarantees of the decentralized algorithm in real-time implementation. Since generation capacity and users' utility functions are constantly changing, the aggregate social welfare of the system will fluctuate and it is unclear how optimal the online decisions will be. In this paper, we focus on investigating and characterizing performance guarantees of an Online Decentralized Dual Descent (OD3) power allocation algorithm. In particular, we assume the power supply and consumers' utilities fluctuate at the same time scale as iterations of our algorithm; we also derive a worstcase bound on the aggregate social welfare of users in the system. Recent efforts on dynamic optimization problems include [12] , [13] .
The literature on price volatility in electricity markets is rich; for example, volatility of electricity prices in renewable energy markets was analyzed in [4] - [6] . Furthermore, volatility of electricity prices has also been studied in the context of spot market pricing, price-based Demand Response (DR) and wholesale market exposure [14] - [18] . While the focus of the referenced works are on pricing dynamics in relation to the operation of electricity markets, in contrast, our focus is on characterizing the difference between real-time and optimal aggregate social welfare of a distribution system. In particular, we derive worstcase bounds on the difference between optimal and real-time decisions based on an OD3 algorithm, using the coordination (price) signal as a tool.
Motivated by the aforementioned challenges, the main contribution of this work is to study a time-varying instance of the social welfare optimization problem, where the available power generation and utility functions of users change at time scales as fast as iterations of algorithms that solve them. This is in contrast to the standard optimal power allocation -where the generation and users' utility are typically assumed fixed or known a priori at each step of a solution algorithm. In particular, we study how fast the optimal social welfare changes, as the available power in the system and utilities of users change. Our results, hence, show how observable changes in available power and users' utilities affect the social welfare. These results also give insights into how to regulate the power market; for example, incentivizing users to appropriately modify their utility functions, to ensure that the social welfare does not significantly deviate (and too quickly) from optimal. Next, we investigate how well the OD3 algorithm can track the time-varying optimal social welfare solutions. We provide bounds on the tracking performance that depend on how fast available supply and users' utility functions change over time. In [9] , we investigated a special case of the OD3 algorithm -the static case, whereas in this paper we consider the more challenging real-time case. Preliminary results of this work appeared in [19] . The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Following notation and definitions, we introduce the system model as well as underlying assumptions, summarize the OD3 power allocation algorithm and state the main result in Section II. Sections III and IV respectively present a volatility analysis of the coordinating (price) signal and power allocation, and convergence analysis of our algorithm. We follow in Section V by briefly characterizing the choice of step-size in the presence of ramp constraints. In Section VI, we present a numerical simulation of our algorithm that demonstrates its performance and make our conclusions in Section VII.
Notation: Vectors and matrices are represented by boldface lower and upper case letters, respectively. We denote the set of real numbers by R, a vector or matrix transpose as (·)
T , and the L2-norm of a vector by || · ||. The gradient of a function f (·) is denoted ∇f (·), and ·, · denotes the inner product of two vectors. We denote the vector of ones as 1, and respectively denote the set of positive and negative reals as R + and R − .
Definitions We say that a function U :
Given two vectors q, r ∈ R n , we say q ≤ r if and only if q i ≤ r i for i = 1, . . . , n.
A function U (·) is said to be monotone decreasing, if for all q 1 ≤ q 2 , it holds that U (q 1 ) ≥ U (q 2 ).
II. MODEL AND ALGORITHM

A. System Model
We consider a power distribution system comprising N users and R primary suppliers. We assume that some users may also locally generate power and sell to the system as secondary sources. The system operator's objective at time t is to solve a decentralized dynamic power allocation problem to maximize the aggregate social welfare of users in the system. We define the aggregate social welfare as the utility users gain from consuming or selling power q i (t) at time t; that is,
where U i,t (·) is the utility of user i at time t. We assume the entire system capacity available to the suppliers is the actual power generation, and that users have constantly changing power needs resulting in a dynamic utility function. Let the convex function C j,t (·) be the cost of generating power by supplier j at time t. We assume each user can choose from the R available power suppliers and let the allocation to the N users be q 1 (t), · · · , q N (t), where q i (t) ∈ R R . The jth entry of the ith vector, q j i (t) represents the power allocation to the ith user from the jth supplier at time t. Furthermore, let the generation of the R primary suppliers at time t be represented by the vector Q(t) ∈ R R , where Q j , the jth entry of Q, represents the power capacity at the jth supplier. At time t, the objective of the system operator is to maximize the social welfare by solving the following time-varying economic dispatch optimization program [20] :
In Problem (3), for each user i, the set Q i ⊂ R + if user i consumes power and Q i ⊂ R − if user i generates power. Without loss of generality and for straightforwardness in analysis, this paper is focused on a special case of Problem (3) where the cost of generation is implicit and users are allowed to sell back power to the grid. Essentially, the system operator is focused on the efficiency and optimal operation of the system with a specific interest in maximizing the aggregate utility of users in the system. In particular, the problem we consider is:
where the constraint q i (t) ∈ Q i is implicit, and the utility gained for power generation is thought of in terms of monetary profit. The equality constraint guarantees that power generation from both primary and secondary sources is not wasted and the system capacity at each time, Q(t) is assumed to be the power generated. The economic dispatch problem in [20] is, for instance, a special case of Problem (4).
Remark 1: In practice, there will be local capacity constraints on the decision variables {q i (t)} N i=1 . While we do not specifically model those capacity constraints, appropriate utility functions U i (·) can be designed to approximate those constraints. Additionally, note that our formulation in Problem (4) is general in the sense that we allow {q i (t)} N i=1 to be negative, indicating the instances where users sell power back to suppliers. This means that users can be elastic suppliers as well.
Problems like (4) are common in power systems, where the utility function may, for instance, represent deviation from desired power demand and capture time-varying utility in power consumed. To make the structure of the users' utility function in Problem (4) a bit more precise, we briefly present examples of such functions below:
Example 1: Consider a power distribution system with one supplier. Let s i (t) ∈ R and q i (t) ∈ R respectively be the power demand and allocation of user i at time t. Let a i be user i's utility if the allocation q i (t) satisfies the demand s i (t). If q i (t) = s i (t) then user i suffers dis-utility. This can be modeled with the time-varying utility function
where the parameter s i (t) captures time-varying utility for user i. The quadratic function above, sketched in Fig. 1 , is strongly concave in q i (t) and is not uncommon in such social welfare optimization problems [8] .
Example 2: In many cases, users have a choice between different power sources. For instance, if a user i has two suppliers, that is, q i (t) ∈ R 2 , the user may demand some power, s i,1 (t), from conventional energy sources (e.g coal) and power, s i,2 (t), from renewable (e.g solar, wind) energy sources. An example of a utility function that captures user i's options is
where δ > 0 is a weighting parameter representing preferences on the power sources.
Since commonly used optimization algorithms are usually iterative, the time-varying nature of the users' local utility functions U i,t (·) and capacity of primary power suppliers Q(t) poses a challenge to solving Problem (4). Another challenge is that the utility functions U i,t (·) are known locally by user i; hence, a solution to Problem (4) needs to be decentralized. We make some assumptions on Problem (4).
Assumption 1: (Strong Concavity): We assume the users' utility functions, U i,t (·), are strongly concave in the variable q t i with concavity parameter σ.
Assumption 2: (Lipschitz Gradients): The gradients of the utility function of each user i is Lipschitz continuous at each time-step. In other words, for all vector pairs q 1 and
Assumptions 1 and 2 easily hold when σ and L are globally known. For example, users can be free to design their utility functions at each time, independent of the other users, so long as the concavity and Lipschitz parameters fall within the global parameters. Our objective is to present a distributed solution to Problem (4) that enables us characterize variation in the social welfare of the system at each time-step as presented in Theorem 1. We investigate the performance of the well-known dual descent algorithm for Problem (4) . Decentralized algorithms that solve (4) can be achieved via duality theory. Let p(t) ∈ R R be the dual variable representing the price charged by the R different suppliers at time t. Then, the dual problem of (4) is
where D t (·) is the dual function and D t (·) is:
Algorithm 1: An Online Decentralized Dual Descent (OD3) Algorithm for optimal power allocation. Initialization: Suppliers set initial price p(0); and let η ∈]0,η] be given. 1:
Suppliers broadcast p(t) 3:
for Users i = 1, . . . , N do 4:
User i receives p(t) and solves (8) 
and q i (p(t)) is the power demand of user i based on price p(t) at time t. Based on (7), the respective local problem for each user i is to solve:
As expected, the optimal power demand at each time-step t for each user i depends on its utility as well as the coordinating signal (price) received from the system operator. The structure of the problem enables us to claim the following result:
Lemma 1: (Strong Duality): Consider Problem (4) at time t, suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and let p * (t) be the optimal solution to (6) . Then q(p
(cf. (8)) is the optimal solution to (4).
Proof: Convexity of the problem coupled with the constraints
, and q i ∈ R R ensures that Problem (4) satisfies Slater's condition, yielding a zero duality gap [21, Chapter 5] .
Proposition 1: Consider Problem (4) and suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then the dual function (7) is strongly convex in p with parameter N/L, and its gradient is Lipschitz continuous with parameter Nσ.
Proof: See Appendix VII for the proof.
B. Algorithm
We solve Problem (4) in a decentralized manner via a dual descent algorithm with η > 0 as step size. Based on aggregate consumption at the previous time-step, the system operator determines and broadcasts the coordinating (price) signal p(t). Consumers then use the pricing information to compute their optimal allocation based on their current utility functions. The system operator gathers the total consumption and computes the next price. We summarize the OD3 procedure in Algorithm 1.
Given Algorithm 1 to solve Problem (4), of interest is to understand and characterize how the online and optimal system decisions and social welfare of the system change with time, given the time-varying supply capacities and consumer utility functions. To prevent drastic variations in the users' utility functions and suppliers' capacities, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 3: Between successive time-steps the changes in suppliers' capacities is bounded by γ; that is,
Assumption 4: We assume that each user i has an upper bound on how much its utility function changes between consecutive time steps; that is,
Assumption 3 prevents drastic changes in the supply capacities between consecutive time-steps, ensuring a smoothness property in capacity at the supplier over time. It is also a pragmatic assumption in the real physical system, as generators are known to have ramp constraints [22] , [23] . Assumption 4 ensures that the rate of change in user utility function over time is bounded -again to avoid drastic changes in power demand between consecutive time-steps for all users.
Theorem 1: (Main Result) Suppose Algorithm 1 is used to solve Problem 4, suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, and that each U i,t (·) is Lipschitz continuous with parameter L . Let q i (t) and q * i (t) respectively be the power allocation obtained from Algorithm 1 and the optimal power allocation at time t. The difference between the aggregate online social welfare (given fluctuations in the system) and aggregate optimal social welfare is bounded by
where
Furthermore, p(0) and p * (0) are respectively the initial online and optimal prices, γ and α are respectively the bounds on variations of the suppliers' generation and users' utility functions.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section IV-B, and based on a series of lemmas and propositions developed in the succeeding sections of the paper.
Remark 2: As can be observed, the upper bound on difference between the aggregate optimal and online social welfare of the system depends not only on the structure of the users' utility function, but also on how much it changes; this, of course, is in addition to the magnitude of generation fluctuation. Also, the bound comprises a fixed term that depends on these fluctuations and a transient term that decays as the OD3 algorithm attempts to closely track the optimal decisions.
Note that for Theorem 1, we assume that the utility functions themselves (and not their gradients as in Assumption 2) are Lipschitz continuous.
III. VOLATILITY ANALYSIS
In this section we derive bounds on changes in the optimal price p * (t) between consecutive time-steps, based on Assumptions 3 and 4.
Theorem 2: (Volatility of the Optimal Price): Consider Problem (4) with Dual Problem (6). Suppose Assumptions 2 -4 hold; then
Proof: Given that the Dual Problem (6) is unconstrained, convex and differentiable, for all t
And by Lemma 4 in Appendix E, the inverse function of the gradient exists. Using the triangle inequality, it follows that
Theorem 2 above implies that price fluctuation is higher when the changes in supply capacity γ and user utility functions α are high. Observe that though the system operator's decisions are optimal between successive time-steps, the deviation in pricing between consecutive time-steps is still nonzero. This is because (both the cost function and constraint set of) the particular social welfare problem being solved by the system operator changes at each time-step. These changes, as noted earlier, are due to the variation in supply capacity and changes in utility functions of the consumers (respectively assumed to be upper-bounded by γ and α). Furthermore, the presence of more users in the system, captured by N (in the first term of the bound) dampens any significant price changes observed between consecutive time-steps caused by the time-varying supplier capacities. In addition, the more concave the form of the utility function of users (for σ > 1), the lower the volatility in the price signal between consecutive time-steps.
Given that the power allocation to any user q i (p(t)) at any time t depends on the price at that time, a consequence of Theorem 2 are bounds on the change in the optimal power allocation to users between consecutive time-steps.
Corollary 1: Consider Problem (4), and given Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal power allocation between consecutive iterates, satisfies
Proof: See Appendix B for a proof.
Similar to the bound in Theorem 2, we find in Corollary 1 that the magnitude of changes in power allocation between consecutive time steps is proportional to the changes experienced in power generation and consumers' utility functions. Furthermore, as highlighted earlier, when no fluctuations are recorded in consumers' utility functions, the size of the user base mitigates the changes in power demand between successive time steps. The bounds derived on the changes in optimal price and power allocation to each user show that so long as the supply capacity and consumer utility functions are not fixed, the optimal operating point of the distribution system will fluctuate (within bounds) between time instances t.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHM 1
In this section, we analyze convergence of Algorithm 1 and its performance with respect to tracking the optimal solution (in Section IV-A). In Section IV-B, we present a proof of the main result of the paper based on the results established in Section IV-A.
A. Convergence and Tracking
In Lemma 2, we show that by appropriately choosing a stepsize η for Algorithm 1, the coordinating/price signal update (cf line 7 of Algorithm 1) is a descent direction.
Lemma 2: For every step-size η such that 0 < η ≤ 2L/(N (1 + Lσ)), and p ∈ R R , the following holds
where c is as defined in Theorem 1.
Proof. Choose any p ∈ R R , and let r t := p
where we have used the fact that the function 
and that ∇D t (p * (t)) = 0 at the optimal p * (t). The last inequality in (14) follows from (15) and the fact that D(·) (with Nσ− Lipschitz continuous gradients) satisfies
If the step-size η is chosen such that 0 < η < 2L/N (1 + Lσ),
and it follows that, for each iterate p obtained from the OD3 Algorithm 1, the bound in (13) holds. The convergence of the OD3 algorithm in Lemma 2 exploits strong convexity of the dual function, D(·), derived from the structure of Problem (4). Choice of η is important for convergence of the algorithm in the static case, and tracking of the optimal solutions in the dynamic case. If η is small, the variable p(t) is updated in a conservative way, resulting in slow convergence. The step size that yields the optimal convergence can easily be obtained by minimizing the parameter c with respect to η. Based on Lemma 2, we present upper bounds on the real-time difference between the optimal price and allocation, and prices and allocations generated by our OD3 algorithm.
Theorem 3: (Tracking the Optimal Dual Variable): Consider the system Problem (4) and its Dual Problem (6) . Regardless of the initial price p(0), the difference between the optimal price p * (t + 1) and the price iterate of Algorithm 1 at each t is
where from Theorem 2 and Lemma 2 respectively,
The bound in (16) has two components: The first term is a constant term which does not vanish over time and depends on the magnitude of the system fluctuation in capacity and changes in user utility functions. The second term of the bound is a transient term (similar to the dual gradient algorithm), which converges to 0 as t → ∞.
Proof. See Appendix C for proof.
Remark 3:
We reiterate that all the bounds presented in this paper represent the worst-case. For example, for each user i and at each time t, the actual Lipschitz constant of ∇U i,t (·) and concavity parameter of U i,t (·), the change in supply capacity or utility function between consecutive time-steps may be less than the parameters used in the bounds.
Theorem 4: (Tracking the Optimal Primal Variable): Consider the System Problem (4) and its Dual Problem (6). Regardless of the initial unit of power allocation per user q i (0), the gap between the optimal allocation q * i (t + 1) and the allocation generated by Algorithm 1 at each t is
where the constant c comes from Theorem 3.
Proof: See Appendix D for proof.
Remark 4:
As in Theorem 3, the bound in Theorem 4 has two terms -a transient term that converges to 0 as t → ∞, and a term that depends on fluctuations in user utility functions and supplier capacity in the distribution system, which does not vanish over time, so long as the systemic fluctuations exist.
B. Proof of Main Result (Theorem 1)
We can now prove Theorem 1), by using Lemma 2, and Theorems 3 and 4.
Proof: To begin, since each U i,t (·) are L -Lipschitz continuous, for any two vectors q i (t), q * i (t) ∈ R R , we have
Summing both sides and using the triangle inequality,
From Theorem 4 we can further bound the Right-Hand-Side (RHS) of the above expression as follows:
Since c < 1 (from Lemma 2), the first term of the bound above goes to zero as t goes to infinity, and the second term is a constant term. Hence, the deviation of the aggregate online social welfare (computed using the OD3 algorithm), from the aggregate optimal social welfare is bounded as proved.
Having proved the main result of the paper, next, we consider the original Problem 4 in the presence of ramp constraints in the power allocation. In particular, the question we address next is: how well does Algorithm 1 perform if the difference in allocation between consecutive time-steps is constrained? In the next section, we briefly highlight the importance of the problem.
V. THE CASE WITH RAMP CONSTRAINTS
In Problem (4), no ramp constraints were imposed on the power allocation decisions between consecutive time-steps. Ramp constraint (on both generation and allocation) in solving decision and optimization problems are important because the ramp rate 1 of generators are not infinite [22] , [23] . In this section, we briefly analyze the OD3 Algorithm 1; in particular, we refine the choice of step-size in the context of the ramp rate constraints by considering the following problem:
We would show that one can satisfy the ramp rate constraint by appropriately tuning the step-size η of Algorithm 1. To demonstrate this, we present the following result: Lemma 3: Suppose Problem (17) is to be solved by Algorithm 1. If the step-size, η, in Algorithm 1 is chosen such that
where κ = c 2 p * (t) − p 2 (the RHS of (13)),q is the upper bound on the ramp-rate between consecutive iterates, and N is the number of users, then the power allocation iterates
produced by Algorithm 1 satisfy the ramp-rate constraints for Problem (17) .
Proof: Recall that the primal update (local at each node i) is expressed as:
and by Lemma 4 in Appendix E,
By Proposition 1, ∇D t (·) is Lipschitz continuous with parameter
Nσ. Hence, using that ∇D t (p * (t)) = 0 we have
which implies that α/σ η∇D t (p(t)) ≤ αηN κ. Hence, for αηN κ ≤q to hold, it is necessary that η ≤q/(Nακ). In Lemma 2, we established that the step-size η in Algorithm 1 needed to satisfy η ≤ 2L/(N (1 + Lσ)); wherefore, (18) holds. To parse Lemma 3, recall that the allocation to each user q i (t) depends on the prices p(t), which in turn depend on the rate at which the gradient of the dual function ∇D(·) changes with respect to the price and the step-size η. This means that givenq in Problem (17), the step-size η can be chosen small enough to simultaneously result in a contraction paramer c (in Lemma 2), and satisfy q i (t) − q i (t + 1) ≤q for each user in the online allocation policy.
VI. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we demonstrate and validate the theoretical results developed in the preceding sections of the paper using real power generation data from the IESO system operator Canada Independent Electricity System Operator [25] . We illustrate the performance of the OD3 power allocation algorithm on Problem (4).
In the convergence analysis of the OD3 algorithm and bounds derived, a critical element of the transient term that vanishes to zero as t → ∞ is the difference between the initial online and optimal price. The farther away p(0) is from p * (0), the longer it takes for the Algorithm 1 to converge. To show effectiveness of Algorithm 1, in the numerical experiments we will present two cases -the first in which the initial online price p(0) = 0 is close to initial optimal price p * (0); and a second case in which the initial online price p(0) = 100 is far away (or arbitrary chosen) from the optimal price p * (0). For the simulation, we consider a system comprising N = 100 users and one supplier, that is R = 1. The number of suppliers do not affect the theoretical bounds, so the use of one supplier in the experiments is without loss of generality. We refer interested readers to Example 2, where we presented an example of a utility function for a user with more than one supplier. For each user i = 1, 2, . . . , 100, we use a utility function of the form presented in Example 1;
2 , where the demand s i (t) takes on different values at each timestep; thus resulting in a time-varying utility function. This choice of utility function U t i (·) is strongly concave (in this case with concavity parameter σ = 2), and satisfies Assumption 1. The real data on power supply was obtained from [25] , where generation data from biofuel, wind and solar sources obtained in 5− minute intervals was used. The data captures real-world variability and fluctuation experienced in renewable energy generation systems. In Fig. 2 , we illustrate the performance of the OD3 Algorithm on Problem (4) and compare the aggregate social welfare, allocation and price computed by the OD3 Algorithm in real time with their respective optimal counterparts in the case where the initial online price p(0) is close to the initial optimal price p * (0), given the fluctuating system dynamics. From the plots in Fig. 2 , one can observe that the online decisions of the OD3 algorithm are close to the optimal decisions at each time-step, despite the fluctuating consumers' utility functions and supply generation. The system generation and total optimal power allocation at each time are overlapping, as observed in Fig. 2(b) . The online decisions are not equal to the optimal decisions over time because the parameters of the problem change at the same time scale as iterations of the OD3 algorithm. Further, the significant variations experienced in the generation capacity (noticed between time-steps 75 and 120) propagate to the online allocation and price (where relatively significant spikes in the power allocated and price per unit power are observed). In Fig. 2(c) , we plot the optimal prices and the real-time prices obtained from our OD3 algorithm.
In Fig. 3 , we consider the case the initial online price p(0) is chosen such that it is far away from the initial optimal price p * (0) and present iterates of the OD3 Algorithm, again comparing the online aggregate social welfare, aggregate power allocation and price to their respective optimal values. For this case, p(0) = 100 was chosen as the initial online price. Despite the large initial online price, the plots in Fig. 3 indicate that the aggregate online social welfare [in Fig. 3(a) ], the aggregate online power allocation [in Fig. 3(b) ] and online price Fig. 2. Plots (a), (b) , and (c) respectively show aggregate social welfare, aggregate optimal allocation and optimal price from using Algorithm 1 over time when the initial price is p(0) = 0. Plot (a) shows the social welfare of the system computed by the OD3 algorithm in real-time and the optimal social welfare over time. Plot (b) shows the the total power allocated to users in real-time in comparison to the optimal total power and the total power supply available over time. Plot (c) illustrates the prices at each time-step generated by the real-time OD3 algorithm and the optimal price. Fig. (a) and (b) respectively illustrate the differences in the aggregate social welfare and price obtained from our numerical experiments, relative to the theoretical bound from our analyses when an initial price of p(0) = 0 is chosen. And Fig. (c) and (d) respectively illustrate the differences in the aggregate social welfare and price obtained from our numerical experiments, relative to the theoretical bound from our analyses when an initial price of p(0) = 100 is chosen. [in Fig. 3(c) ], all closely track their respective optimal counterparts. In Fig. 3(c) , we plot the optimal and prices from our OD3 algorithm. As expected, the system generation and total optimal power allocation in Fig. 3(b) overlap at each time. This indicates that the OD3 algorithm is able to shrink the difference between the optimal decisions and the online decisions over time, except for the system fluctuations that do remain present over time. To lessen the volatility experienced in the first few time steps of the algorithm resulting from choosing an 'improper' initial price, a system operator may use secondary sources of power to allow more flexibility in pricing before the coordination stabilizes. As in Fig. 2 , we can also observe that in Fig. 3 , the spikes resulting from the inconsistent generation and dynamic consumer utility functions propagate to the coordinating signal and aggregate social welfare of the system. Fig. 4 , illustrates the difference between the OD3 and optimal price and aggregate social welfare in relation to the theoretical worst-case bounds for different initial prices. Fig. 4(a) and (b) respectively illustrate the difference between the optimal and OD3 aggregate social welfare, and the optimal and OD3 price when the initial price is p(0) = 0. And Fig. 4(c) and (d) respectively illustrate the difference between the optimal and OD3 aggregate social welfare, and the optimal and OD3 price when the initial price is p(0) = 100.
The looseness of the bound comes from the fact that at each time-step, the values of γ and α in Assumptions 3 and 4 used in the theoretical analyses are assumed to be the largest possible values across all time. This is in contrast to the actual values used from the power generation data in [25] and the utility functions of users. This major difference explains the gap between the actual bound obtained from our numerical experiments and the bound from the theoretical analyses.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered the problem of allocating electric power to users in a power system, where the utility functions of the users and generation capacities of the suppliers vary with time. We assumed the changes in the supplier capacities and user utility functions change at the same time-scale as iterations in the algorithm, and presented a worst-case analysis of the OD3 algorithm. In particular, we investigated and characterized performance guarantees of the OD3 power allocation algorithm by deriving bounds on the difference between the aggregate real-time and optimal social welfare of the system as a function of systemic fluctuations. The OD3 algorithm uses a one-way message passing protocol between the users and the suppliers in which a system operator broadcasts a coordinating signal (price) and the users locally compute their power allocation based on the price received and their utility function. The results obtained were illustrated using real data [25] . The worst-case bounds on the fluctuation in the aggregate social welfare of the power system derived in this paper depends on parameters of users' utility function, generation fluctuation, and the number of users in the system. A natural question of interest is how a system operator may influence or incentivize users to, for instance, choose utility functions with parameters that help better optimize the aggregate social welfare and mitigate the aggregate system volatility. The ability to adjust these may have an effect on how much fluctuation the distribution system experiences.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: Let L be the global Lipschitz continuity parameter for all users i and time t. Consider the decomposed dual function
with gradient
where q i (p) is defined in (8 
where the equality comes from taking the gradient of the dual function and using the optimal solutions (8 
or by using ∇U (q 1 ) = p 1 and ∇U (q 2 ) = p 2 , we get
Hence, (19) holds and we can conclude that
APPENDIX B PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof: Let us define w i (t)
is 1/σ-Lipschitz continuous, and the bound in Theorem 2, via the triangle inequality one obtains
where we have used that [∇U i,t ] −1 is 1/σ-Lipschitz continuous, see , and (26) in Lemma (5) (in Appendix E) together with Theorem (2).
APPENIDX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: Using the triangle inequality, we can express the LHS of (16) as
Observe that bounds for the first and second summands of the RHS above have been respectively derived in Lemma 2 and Theorem 2. Since p
which concludes the proof.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: For simplicity in notation, let Q = q i (t + 1) − q * i (t + 1) . Via the triangle inequality, we can express the LHS of (16) as
where the second inequality comes from the fact that ∇U Since Γ is Nσ/L 2 -strongly monotone decreasing it follows by the same arguments as a) that Γ is bijective. The fact that Γ is N/σ-Lipschitz continuous follows from the fact that the sum of Lipschitz continuous functions is also Lipschitz continuous. d) Using the same argument as in b) Γ(·) is Nσ/L 2 monotone decreasing. Hence, for any y 1 , y 2 , x 1 , x 2 ∈ R such that y 1 = Γ(x 1 ) and y 2 = Γ(x 2 ), we get by using Cauchy-Schwarz that 
where 
By Lemma 4-a) there exist x 1 , x 2 ∈ R N such that ∇U 
where the second inequality comes by that U i (·) is σ-concave, (see By summing over (28) and using triangle inequality we get also that
Now take any Q ∈ R R . Using that Γ t and Γ t+1 are bijective, (from Lemma 4-c)), there exists p 1 , p 2 ∈ R N such that Q = Γ t (p 1 ) = Γ t+1 (p 2 ). Similarly, we obtain 0 = Q − Q = Γ t+1 (p 2 ) − Γ t (p 1 )
since from Lemma 4-c) Γ t+1 (·) is Nσ/L 2 -convex. Finally, by rearranging (32) and using that Γ t and Γ t+1 are bijective, (from Lemma 4-c)), we get that αL 
